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Abstract
This paper examines how background risk aﬀects risk taking under rank-
dependent utility. I assume that a decision-maker facing a risk taking decision
in the presence of background risk views these risks as composing a compound
lottery, and recursively evaluates this compound lottery using rank-dependent
utility. I show that adding background risk increases risk aversion whenever the
utility-for-wealth function is risk vulnerable (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) in this
model.
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1 Introduction
People who face risky decisions almost invariably have uninsurable pre-existing risks,
and empirical work suggests that such pre-existing risks tend to make people more
risk averse (Guiso et al., 1996; Guiso and Paiella, 2008; Beaud and Willinger, 2015).
Previous research has provided, under expected utility (EU), necessary and suﬃcient
conditions on a a decision-maker's (DM) utility-for-wealth function for the DM to
exhibit more risk aversion following a deterioration in background risk (Gollier and
Pratt, 1996; Eeckhoudt et al., 1996). This paper provides analogous results for a re-
cursive application of rank-dependent utility (RDU) by showing that these conditions
remain suﬃcient under RDU.
It is known that in RDU, a DM's evaluation of risks may depend on how and when
they resolve (Segal, 1990). I assume that a DM who is oﬀered the opportunity to take
an additional risk (1) views the additional risk and her background risk as forming
a two-stage lottery with her background risk being resolved at the second stage,
and (2) evaluates two-stage lotteries recursively (consistent with Segal's compound
independence axiom).1 Theorem 2 shows that if the DM has RDU preferences and her
utility-for-wealth is risk vulnerable in the sense of (Gollier and Pratt, 1996), then she
exhibits more risk aversion when faced with an actuarially unfavorable background
risk. Theorem 2 provides the analogous result for ﬁrst- and second- order stochastic
dominance (FSD and SSD) deteriorations in background risk.
My results contrast with those of Quiggin (2003) and Safra and Segal (2008), who
assume that a DM integrates any additional risk and her background risk into a single
lottery using the laws of probability (as required by the reduction of compound lotter-
ies axiom) and ﬁnd that in RDU and related models, risk aversion due to probability
weighting is attenuated by the presence of uninsurable background risk.
1The modeling approach to risk taking with background risk under recursive non-expected utility
builds on Freeman (2015), who uses this approach to show that many non-expected utility theories,
including RRDU, can capture descriptively reasonable small-stakes risk aversion without implying
absurd large-stakes risk aversion. See Dillenberger (2010) for another recent application of recursive
non-expected utility over multi-stage lotteries.
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2 Model
2.1 Preliminaries
The setup follows Freeman (2015). LetW = [a, b] ⊂ R+ denote the set of feasible ﬁnal
wealth levels; let ∆(W ) denote the set of all ﬁnite-support probability distributions
over W , and refer to ∆(W ) as the set of one-stage lotteries over W . A one-stage
lottery over W can be written as q = [w1, q1; ...;wm, qm] ∈ ∆(W ), where qi denotes
the probability of receiving prize wi; for such lotteries, adopt the convention that
w1 ≤ ... ≤ wm. Given q ∈ ∆(W ), let Fq denote the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of q. For a given q ∈ ∆(W ) and y ∈ R, let q + y = [w1 + y, q1; ...;wm + y, qm];
the resulting q + y is only in ∆(W ) if w1 + y ≥ a and wm + y ≤ b; I omit this caveat
in statements below for expositional ease.
Deﬁne a two-stage lottery as a ﬁnite-support lottery over lotteries over ﬁnal wealth
levels. A two-stage lottery can be written as Q = [q1, p1; ...; q
n, pn] where q
i ∈ ∆(W )
and pi is the probability of receiving lottery q
i. Let ∆(∆(W )) denote the set of
two-stage lotteries.
2.2 Preferences over compound lotteries
I assume that a DM has RDU (Quiggin, 1982; Yaari, 1987) preferences over single-
stage lotteries. V : ∆(W ) → R is a rank-dependent utility function if there exist
strictly increasing functions and continuous u : W → R and g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such
that for any q ∈ ∆(W ), V (q) = ∫ u(w)dg(Fq(w). The function g is called a probability
weighting function, and is required to satisfy g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1; the function u is
called a utility-for-wealth function. Notice that EU corresponds to the special case of
RDU in which the probability weighting function is linear. Given an RDU function
V , let c denote its corresponding certainty equivalent function deﬁned by c = u−1 ◦V .
In the analysis that follows, assume that V is risk averse  that is, averse to mean-
preserving spreads. This is equivalent to assuming that g and u are both weakly
concave (Chew et al., 1987).
I assume that a DM applies her single-stage lottery preferences to any two-stage
lottery recursively. That is, the DM evaluates Q = [q1, p1; ...; q
n, pn] by ﬁrst applying c
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to each qi to obtain the single-stage lottery [c(q1), p1; ...; c(q
n), pn], to which she applies
V . This assumes that the DM applies the same single-stage lottery preferences at
each stage of the two-stage lottery, as in Segal's (1990) time neutrality axiom. To
capture this criterion, given an RDU function with certainty equivalent function c,
deﬁne the corresponding Recursive RDU (RRDU) function U : ∆(∆(W )) → R over
two-stage lotteries by U(Q) = V ([c(q1), p1; ...; c(q
n), pn]).
An normatively-appealing alternative way to apply V to two-stage lotteries is
to use the laws of probability to reduce any two-stage lottery Q to a single-stage
lottery and apply V to this reduced lottery. Given any two-stage lottery Q =
[q1, p1; ...; q
n, pn], deﬁne the reduction of Q, denoted Q
R, by by the single-stage lot-
tery with CDF FQR =
n∑
i=1
piFqi ; when each q
i has ﬁnite support, this gives QR =
[w1,
n∑
i=1
piq
i
1; ...;wK ,
n∑
i=1
piq
i
K ]. This leads to the following deﬁnition: a DM reduces com-
pound lotteries if she evaluates the desirability of any two-stage lottery Q according
to V (QR).
2.3 Risk taking with background risk
Deﬁne a gamble as a ﬁnite-support lottery over gain and loss prizes (as opposed to
wealth levels). Consider a DM with wealth level w who faces background wealth risk
described by the gamble qˆ = [y′1, q1; ...; y
′
m, qm], which is not the subject of choice.
This DM is oﬀered the gamble over prizes pˆ = (y1, p1; ...; yn, pn). Each yi ∈ R is a
monetary prize added to or taken away from the DM's ﬁnal wealth after lottery pˆ
resolves and each y′i ∈ R is similarly a monetary gain or loss similarly added to or
taken away from the DM's ﬁnal wealth after qˆ resolves.2
Let pˆ⊕ qˆ+w denote the two-stage lottery formed by the simple gamble over prizes
pˆ, which resolves at the ﬁrst stage, and independent background risk qˆ, which resolves
at the second stage, given initial wealth w. When qˆ has ﬁnite support, the two-stage
lottery pˆ⊕ qˆ + w is given by
pˆ⊕ qˆ + w = [qˆ + y1 + w, p1; ...; qˆ + yn + w, pn] (1)
2I assume that background risk resolves after the oﬀered gamble, however, if this order were
reversed, it would require only straightforward modiﬁcations to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.
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where qˆ+ yi +w = [y
′
1 + yi +w, q1; ...; y
′
m + yi +wm, qm] denotes the lottery over ﬁnal
wealth states that the DM faces if prize yi is won in the gamble pˆ.
Take an RDU certainty equivalent function c and its associated RRDU function
U . Consider the following behavioral properties of c. Deﬁne that adding actuarially
unfavorable background risk increases risk aversion if for any gamble pˆ ∈ ∆(Y ),
any gamble qˆ ∈ ∆(Y ) with a weakly negative expected value, and any admissible
w ∈ W , c(pˆ + w) ≤ w implies that U(pˆ⊕ (w + qˆ)) ≤ V (w + qˆ). Deﬁne that an FSD
(SSD) deterioration in background risk increases risk aversion if for any gambles
pˆ, qˆ, rˆ ∈ ∆(Y ) for which qˆ ﬁrst-order (second-order) stochastically dominates rˆ, and
any admissible w ∈ W , c(pˆ⊕ qˆ+w) ≤ c(qˆ+w) implies that U(pˆ⊕ rˆ+w)) ≤ V (rˆ+w).
3 The eﬀect of background risk on risk taking in
RRDU
Following Gollier and Pratt (1996) , deﬁne that a utility-for-wealth function u is risk
vulnerable if for any qˆ ∈ ∆(Y ) with a weakly negative expected value and for any w,
−
∫
u′′(w + y)dFqˆ(y)∫
u′(w + yi)dFqˆ(y)
≥ −u
′′(w)
u′(w)
.
Gollier and Pratt (Proposition 1) show that risk vulnerability of u is a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the addition of an unfavorable background risk to increase risk
aversion over oﬀered gambles in EU  their result is presented as Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) Under EU, adding an actuarially unfavor-
able background risk increases risk aversion if and only if u is risk vulnerable.
Theorem 1 shows that if the utility-for-wealth function u is risk vulnerable, then
any RRDU function with utility-for-wealth function u and a concave g that evalu-
ates oﬀered gambles according to (1) also has the property that adding unfavorable
background risk increases risk aversion.
Theorem 1. Suppose U is an RRDU function with a concave probability weighting
function g and a concave utility-for-wealth function u. If u is risk vulnerable, then
adding an actuarially unfavorable background risk increases risk aversion.
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Proof. Suppose U captures a DM's RRDU preferences, with corresponding proba-
bility weighting function g and a risk vulnerable utility-for-wealth function u. Let
pˆ, qˆ ∈ ∆(Y ) with ∫ ydqˆ(y) ≤ 0.
Suppose c turns down pˆ at wealth level w. Then,∫
u(w + y)dg(Fpˆ(y)) < u(w) . (2)
Since g is a probability weighting function, g◦Fpˆ and g◦Fqˆ are CDFs corresponding
to gambles in ∆(Y ). Equation (2) is equivalent to an EU maximizer with utility-for-
wealth function u turning down the gamble with CDF g ◦ Fpˆ.
Since
∫
ydFqˆ(y) ≤ 0 and g is concave, it follows that
∫
ydg(Fqˆ(y)) ≤
∫
ydFqˆ(y) ≤
0. Thus g ◦ Fqˆ is the CDF of an actuarially unfair gamble.
Since u is risk vulnerable and an EU maximizer with utility-for-wealth function
u turns down the gamble with CDF g ◦ F pˆ at wealth w, by Proposition 1, an EU-
maximizer with utility-for-wealth function u, wealth w, and background risk g ◦ Fqˆ
also turns down pˆ, that is,
∫ ∫
u(w + y + x)dg(Fpˆ(y))dg(Fqˆ(x)) <
∫
u(w + x)dg(Fqˆ(x)) .
Equivalently, U(pˆ⊕ (w + qˆ)) < V (w + qˆ)
Thus such a DM will also turn down pˆ when she faces actuarially unfavorable
background risk qˆ. Since the choices of pˆ and qˆ were arbitrary, conclude that adding
an unfavorable background risk increases risk aversion for an RRDU DM with a risk
vulnerable u.
The main step of the proof shows that in this approach to modeling background
risk under RRDU, probability weighting is separately applied to the background risk
and to the additional risk. Because of this, an RRDU risk taking decision with a given
background risk is equivalent to an EU risk taking decision involving transformed risks
obtained by applying the RDU probability weighting function. This provides a way
to port existing results on the impact of background risk on risk taking in EU to the
RRDU model, and I provide two additional results that follow from this insight.
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One might notice that in Proposition 1 (from Gollier and Pratt 1996), risk vulnera-
bility of u is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for adding an unfavorable background
risk to increase risk aversion, whereas under RRDU, it is only a suﬃcient condition.
The gap between the two results stems from the fact that for any actuarially unfavor-
able gamble with CDF F , the transformed gamble g◦F is also actuarially unfavorable
when g is a concave probability weighting function. Corollary 1 provides the anal-
ogous necessary and suﬃcient behavioral condition for u to be risk vulnerable, and
given Proposition 1, follows from the proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Suppose U is an RRDU function with a concave probability weight-
ing function g and a concave utility-for-wealth function u. The utility-for-wealth
function u is risk vulnerable if and only if adding any background risk qˆ for which∫
ydg(Fq(y)) ≤ 0 increases risk aversion.
A remaining question is how these results could be generalized to provide a con-
dition for g and u for which, under RRDU, an increase in background risk, from qˆ to
the riskier rˆ, raises risk aversion. I answer that question for the cases in which rˆ is
related to qˆ by FSD or SSD.
Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) provide two conditions that, under EU, they show are
necessary and suﬃcient for FSD and SSD deteriorations in background risk to increase
risk aversion. Theorem 2 below shows that these conditions on u are also suﬃcient
in RRDU.
Theorem 2. Suppose U is an RRDU function with a concave probability weighting
function g and a concave utility-for-wealth function u. If there exists a λ ∈ R such
that −u′′′(w′)
u′′(w′) ≥ λ ≥ −u
′′(w)
u′(w) ∀w,w′ ∈ [a, b], then an FSD deterioration in background
risk increases risk aversion. If, in addition, there exists a κ ∈ R such that −u′′′′(w′)
u′′′(w′) ≥
κ ≥ −u′′(w)
u′(w) ∀w,w′ ∈ [a, b], then an SSD deterioration in background risk increases
risk aversion.
Proof. If qˆ ﬁrst- (second-) order stochastically dominates rˆ, then g◦Fqˆ ﬁrst- (second-)
order stochastically dominates g ◦ Frˆ (Chew et al., 1987).
The results then follow by applying this fact, the proof of Theorem 1, and Eeck-
houdt et al.'s Proposition 2 (and 3).
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Quiggin (2003) shows that very diﬀerent results hold under RDU with reduction
of compound lotteries. For comparison, I summarize his result in the setting of this
paper as Proposition 2.3
Proposition 2. (Quiggin, 2003) If a DM has RDU preferences with a linear u and
she reduces compound lotteries, then adding an actuarially unfavorable background
risk reduces risk aversion.
4 Discussion
The RRDU model here parsimoniously accommodates violations of the independence
axiom and reduction of compound lotteries as well as small-stakes risk aversion. The-
orem 1 showed that when u is risk vulnerable RRDU is also consistent with evidence
that background risk increases risk aversion. Thus the model here provides a tractable
and descriptively-motivated way to apply RDU in the presence of background risk
that avoids the descriptively problematic predictions that follow under reduction of
compound lotteries.
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